The Hungary Dilemma: Why the European Union cannot expel Viktor Orbán
The European Union currently faces a strategic impasse as it seeks to approve its 20th sanctions package against Russia and a vital €90 billion financial aid package for Ukraine’s 2026-2027 defense needs. Viktor Orbán, maintaining a controversial alignment with Moscow, continues to block both initiatives, demanding the restoration of Russian oil flows via the Druzhba pipeline.
This obstructionism has revived a persistent question in diplomatic circles: why can the EU not simply expel Hungary? The answer lies in a foundational legal void. The European treaties were designed as an integrationist project with no built-in mechanism for the involuntary expulsion of a member state.
While Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty provides a voluntary exit path—as demonstrated by the United Kingdom in 2020—Budapest has no incentive to initiate a "Huxit." Hungary remains a net beneficiary of EU funds, utilizing these resources to bolster domestic political stability while avoiding the immense economic risks of isolation.
The EU’s primary defensive tool is Article 7, often described as the "nuclear option." This mechanism allows for the suspension of a member's voting rights in the European Council. However, activating this requires absolute unanimity among all other member states.
The path to sanctions is further complicated by political shifts in Central Europe. The Kremlin-aligned administration of Robert Fico in Slovakia creates a "mutual protection" dynamic, as any vote to suspend Hungary’s rights would likely be vetoed by Bratislava, and vice versa.
The European Union finds itself in a paradox where its founding values are being tested by a member state that, by modern democratic standards, would likely fail the initial criteria for accession today. While expulsion remains legally impossible, the EU’s only remaining leverage is sustained fiscal pressure and the complex, multi-stage implementation of Article 7.
Translation by Iurie Tataru
